Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Model uncertainty is an important issue in the context of environmental policy for at least two reasons: First, existing knowledge of the evolution of the ecological system is still somewhat speculative (physical system uncertainty).
1 Second, there is a deficiency of accurate information regarding the future costs of environmental damage or future benefits from avoiding it (economic uncertainty). 2 Therefore, the uncertainty inherent in environmental and economic modelling is receiving increasing attention and many policymakers are worried about the "unknown unknowns". In this paper we focus on one particular aspect of uncertainty, namely how optimal policy decisions depend upon uncertainty about the "true" model. In other words, we contribute to the uncertainty literature by studying how environmental policymakers' concerns about model robustness alter optimal environmental policy. In contrast to stochastic control, robust control methods seek to bound the uncertainty rather than express it in the form of a probability distribution. Given a bound on the uncertainty, the control can deliver results that meet the control system requirements in all potential cases. Therefore robust control theory may be seen as a worst-case analysis method rather than a typical case method. Thus, the procedure is particularly suitable to deal with low-probability extreme climate events.
To reflect the policymaker's concerns over misbehaving models, we use recently developed robust control techniques by Hansen and Sargent (2000 . HS have initiated a research agenda that introduces the notion of robustness into model uncertainty and addresses 1 The recently published fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) illustrates a curious aspect of the science of climate change. Studying the climate system reveals new, little understood, mechanisms and feedback effects that may increase or decrease warming. So as understanding grows, predictions become less, rather than more certain. Thus, the IPCC´s range of predictions of the rise in the temperature by 2100 has increased from 1. concerns about model misspecification. Methodologically they modify techniques from the robust control literature in applied mathematics. In a nutshell, the fundamental idea of robustness is that economic and environmental models are best viewed as stylised approximations of reality rather than perfect descriptions thereof. When policy-makers use a particular model as guidance in a dynamic decision-making situation and worry that the model may be misspecified, one would expect them to insist on considering alternative models in order to obtain decision rules that not only work well within the baseline model but also work reasonably well when the model is misspecified. It is in this sense that a policy is designed to be robust. In this paper, however, policymakers are assumed to achieve robustness by considering a worst-case model that is similar to and statistically difficult to distinguish from the baseline model. In other words, the policymaker considers a set of alternative models which are "close" to the baseline model, where distance between the models is measured by an entropy or likelihood-type criterion.
In the existing literature, this methodology has been extensively used for the design of monetary policy under uncertainty. It has overturned Brainard´s (1967) conservatism principle and provides a rationale for monetary policy reacting more aggressively to changes in output and inflation under model uncertainty compared to an environment without model uncertainty. The only application of this technique in an environmental model so far is Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas (2004). In their paper the fishery management problem is handled using robust optimal control, where the objective is to choose a harvesting rule that will work, in the sense of preventing instabilities and overfishing, under a range of admissible specifications for the stock recruitment equation. The main topic of our paper is to analyse robust CO 2 abatement policies in an uncertain modelling context.
The paper proceeds as follows. As a foundation for the subsequent analysis, in Section 2 we briefly introduce the notion of robustness laid out by HS. The baseline model is introduced in Section 3.
Building on the robustness concept, in Section 4 we proceed to an analysis of the scenario where a policymaker faces uncertainty regarding the model on which he bases his optimal policy decisions.
Section 5 summarises and draws some conclusions.
Hansen-Sargent Robustness
Misgivings over models have existed for as long a time as models themselves. This section gives an intuitive introduction to the recently developed concept of HS robustness, which deals with uncertainty by deriving optimal solutions in a restricted worst case model, where the restriction in turn depends on the underlying model. The core idea is to treat the decision maker's model as an approximation of the true model. given, and builds a set of possible data generating processes around this model, so that the true model is one model in this set. This is graphically shown in Figure 1 . A standard result in optimal control theory is certainty equivalence, which results under the assumption of a linear model with additive uncertainty and a quadratic loss function. Certainty equivalence implies that only the mean values, i.e. the probability-weighted average outcomes of target variables matter for the optimal setting. Certainty equivalence therefore implies that low probability disturbances should not be taken into account, only the first (statistical) moment matters for policy, not the higher moments. In order to come to grips with this problem, robust control theorists add an additional vector process {w t+1 } to the model that depends in a possibly non-linear way on the history of the state variables:
(1) , (1) where E is the expectations operator and q > 0 represents the decision maker´s preference for robustness. The preference for robustness falls as q rises, so that the problem is equal to its non-robust version when q reaches infinity.
In equation (2) the usual minimisation problem is transformed into a min-max problem. The solution of equation (2) It can be verified that the restriction upon the evil agent (the choice of η 0 ) depends on θ. Thus, all 5 Note that the additional shock terms are given by ω t+1 . Therefore the misspecification of the model is masked by the shock terms ε t+1 and cannot be observed. 6 The fictitious second rational agent is a metaphor. Nevertheless, one interpretation may be to consider country 1 that tries to reduce emissions but is afraid that country 2 will undo all its good work. Thus country 2 would alter the properties of the model. 7 This is an advantage as it simplifies the analysis, but it also implies that it is not possible to study the impact of specific types of uncertainty. The standard modelling approach without model uncertainty corresponds to
types of misspecification are handled by specifying only one parameter, q.
8 A lower θ means that the policymaker designs a policy which is appropriate for a wider set of model misspecifications.
Therefore, a lower θ is equivalent to a higher degree of robustness.
The choice of the robustness parameter is therefore crucial for the choice of a plausible range of model uncertainty. 9 To overcome the problem of specifying an arbitrary range for θ, we follow HS and employ what they refer to as a detection error probability approach. The basic idea is that the alternative models a policymaker faces should not be easily distinguishable when one uses a reasonable set of data. HS employ statistical theory to formulate a probability for discriminating between the approximating model and the distorted model and, consequently, to obtain a modelspecific θ. With equal prior weights, the Bayesian detection error probability is defined as p(q) = 1/2 (p a + p d ), where p i represents the frequency of simulations with a log likelihood ratio smaller or equal to zero, when the approximating (i = a) or the distorted (i = d) model is assumed to be the data generating process. HS suggest setting p(q) at a plausible value and then inverting p(q) to find a plausible value for the robustness parameter. They advise using a value for the detection error probability of around 10% in a sample of size 150.
The HS approach presented above will facilitate the analysis of environmental policy under model uncertainty in the coming sections.
The Baseline Model
The reduced-form baseline model is in the spirit of Pindyck (2001) . However, we do not study the optimal timing of adopting an irreversible policy. Instead, we focus on the question of whether a stabilisation policy should be more aggressive when a policymaker is concerned about uncertainty.
We assume that the authority is able to control the path of emissions, but do not specify possible policies, such as taxes on emissions, the adoption of new technologies or the sequestering of carbon from the atmosphere in sinks, respectively. Moreover, we assume that reducing emissions is costly.
For convenience, and for illustrative purposes, our analysis focuses on the concentration of carbon.
However, this approach can be used for any other stock of environmental pollutants which fulfil the following assumptions. Let CA t be a state variable, representing the average concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, and CO t be the control variable, representing the rate of CO 2 emissions.
10 Then the evolution of CA t can be described by 8 In fact, the size of ω t+1 is directly penalized through θ, which is equivalent to the Lagrange multiplier on (2) in a min-max problem E 0 (∑r(x t , u t )) subject to (1) and (3). 9 Given this feature of HS robustness, Svensson (2002) has argued that a robust planner could also be a fool, worrying too much over implausible catastrophes, just by setting the value for q too low. 10 We assume that without policy intervention, CO t follows an exogenous trajectory. By subtracting the equilibrium relationship, equation (4) subject to (6), where δ represents the discount factor. However, the policymaker knows that the model could be subject to a range of distortions. Therefore, the task is to reformulate the optimisation problem such that the resulting policy rule performs sufficiently well even if the model deviates from the baseline model.
Optimal Robust Policy
Keeping the preceding analysis in mind, let us now examine the resulting optimal robust policy. To solve for the optimal solution we construct the Lagrangian for the problem where {y t+i , i ≥ 0} is the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers. For simplicity we solve the problem as if the social planner is able to choose optimal values for {co t+i , i ≥ 0} and {ca t , i ≥ 0}. In a second step we then solve for the optimal path of the control variable {co t }. The first order conditions from (10) are given by The sequence {e co,t+1 } is a second i.i.d. shock process with zero mean and a variance of one, and captures the fact that emissions can not be perfectly controlled by the policymaker. In order to incorporate concern for model misspecification when using HS robust modelling techniques, the resulting max-min-problem can be transformed into a standard RE-program Since we believe that plausible values for the stabilization preference should be related to marginal costs of CO 2 -emissions, we use empirical studies on marginal costs to derive plausible values for γ.
The marginal damage cost is defined as the net present value of the incremental damage due to a marginal increase in CO 2 emissions. Unfortunately, with regard to suitable values for almost all parameters there exists wide disagreement between experts. Therefore it is crucial to subject all results to sensitivity testing. Our marginal cost estimates are derived from Tol (2005) , who summarizes 103 empirical studies and builds one composite probability density function for all studies. As we believe that estimates should withstand a quality test, we rely only on peer-reviewed studies and use the mode (5 $/ton of carbon), the mean (50 $/tC), the median (14 $/tC), the 5% percentile (-9 $/tC) and the 95% percentile (245 $/tC) from Tol's (2005) density function for those studies. For the discount factor we assume the standard value for yearly periods of 0.96.
Formally, policy rules resulting from the optimisation problem (16) solve for the optimal strategy and are of the form co t = aco t-1 + bca t . In Table 1 results for (a, b) are given for different values of λ and g for the robust and the non-robust case. Robust solutions are computed for a robustness parameter θ that corresponds to a detection error probability near 10% in a sample of 150, using Monte Carlo simulations. Several points deserve further emphasis. All parameter combinations clearly show that losses become greater under uncertainty, and that a robust policymaker should react more aggressively on deviations of carbon from equilibrium. Furthermore, all reaction parameters on last period's emissions decrease (increase in absolute value), which can also be interpreted as a more aggressive stabilization policy. 13 Thus, the policymaker adopts a more prudent, or precautionary, standpoint.
14 Note also that with rising mitigation costs, optimal policies become more defensive. When a reduction in emissions is more expensive, the policymaker reacts with more patience and the optimal path to equilibrium is prolonged. Thus it is no surprise that losses also rise when mitigation costs increase. In contrast, a rise in the stabilization preference parameter leads to more aggressive policies in order to reduce the atmospheric carbon content. For higher mitigation costs the results appear to be very robust, since optimal policies and losses are nearly identical for all preference parameters. Furthermore, optimal reaction functions for λ = 202600 $/Gt 2 and λ = 224000 $/Gt 2 do not differ substantially.
To illustrate the differences due to uncertainty, we simulate the paths for ca t and co t for three different stabilisation scenarios: In the first scenario the policymaker tries to stabilize the carbon concentration on today's value, which is assumed to be 760 Gt of carbon equivalent. 15 Due to (5) the corresponding equilibrium amount of CO 2 emissions is 7.68 Gt carbon equivalent. For the second scenario we assume there exists a policymaker who wants to reduce the carbon concentration to 600
Gt, which implies equilibrium emissions of 6.06 Gt. Scenario 3 refers to stabilizing the atmospheric concentration at 500 Gt, which leads to 5.05 Gt equilibrium emissions. As optimal policies do not differ much for high values of λ, and medium values for γ, simulations are done for λ = {0.14, 2.45}
and g = {5600, 202600}. For all simulations we use starting values for CA of 760 Gt and for CO of 8
Gt. The resulting graphs are shown in Figure 2 and confirm the indications of Table 1 . We run simulations for the standard optimal policy without a concern for robustness (-), for the robust solution under uncertainty (x), and for the robust rule in the approximating model without evil agent Whereas the robust emission reductions differ substantially from both the non-robust results and the robust policy in the approximating model, the evolution of the atmospheric carbon content seems to be very similar for all simulations and scenarios, except for scenario I. When the aim of the policymaker is to stabilise the atmospheric carbon content on today's level, the concentration rises first by a small amount, before it returns slowly to its equilibrium value. The robust and non-robust dynamics look very similar, but using the robust rule in the approximating environment -the case of unfounded fear of model misspecification -reduces the carbon content much faster than in either of the other cases. Comparing the two corresponding columns of Table 1 suggests that the policymaker allows the atmospheric content of carbon to stay above equilibrium for a longer time horizon when the mitigation costs rise. This can be seen best for a high stabilisation preference. Figure 2 shows the plausible result that, for a higher preference of stabilisation, emissions should be reduced by a greater amount, as this brings about a faster decrease in the atmospheric carbon content. In addition, the Figure 2 illustrates that for a policymaker with a high stabilization preference, whose aim is to stabilize the atmospheric carbon content at a lower level than that of today, and for low mitigation 15 This is in line with the latest estimation of the IPCC of 370 ppmv, see Metz (2005) .
costs, it can be optimal to reduce emissions very sharply and keep them below their equilibrium value for a long time, in order to enforce the reduction of the atmospheric content of carbon. All simulations illustrate that the introduction of a second malevolent player implies a higher emissions trajectory, although the reduction policy is more aggressive. This is compatible with the increase in losses due to uncertainty, shown in Table 1 . Using the robust solution in the approximating model illustrates the increased aggressiveness in stabilisation policies, since ca t as well as co t reach their equilibrium faster. A robust environmental policymaker fears stronger damages from not reducing emissions, and thus chooses a more aggressive reduction policy. Viewed from the opposite perspective, model uncertainty does not justify conservatism.
Conclusions
This paper develops a linear quadratic approach to study optimal emissions paths subject to stabilisation preferences and mitigation costs for three different scenarios: (i) a stabilisation on today's atmospheric carbon content (760 Gt carbon equivalent), (ii) a reduction to 600 Gt carbon equivalent, (ii) and a reduction to 500 Gt carbon equivalent. For a plausible model specification the results suggest that emissions should be stabilized within the next 5-7 years, independent of the underlying stabilisation scenario. However, even for a stabilisation of emissions within the next 7 years, the atmospheric carbon content will need about 400 years to reach its steady state.
Furthermore, we investigate optimal reduction policies under uncertainty, using the appealing HS robust control technique.
What can policymakers who have a preference for robustness of optimal policy with respect to misspecification of the underlying model learn from this research? What kind of response is appropriate to the climate threat? The optimal policy trajectories lead to the conclusion that a policymaker who fears model misspecification should react more aggressively. This qualitative result resembles those of monetary policy under model uncertainty.
16
Although the example of CO 2 emissions is used to demonstrate the robust modelling approach, the method is transferable to other environmental problems surrounded by model uncertainties. We hope that further applications of the robust modelling technique will soon follow, making use of increasing processor speeds which makes robustness analysis feasible for larger climate models requiring more computational time. By doing this, the gap between robust control theory and its application may close.
